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840 8uARDIANSHIP OF KAWAKITA [42C.2d 
fL A. No. 22281. Ia Beak. May 28, 1954..] 
Guardianship of the Persons and Estates of HIROKO 
KAWAKITA et aL, Minors. HIROKO KAWAKITA 
et aL, Appellants, T. W. H. LORENZ, as Guardian, etc., 
Respondent. 
[1] Guardian &Wi Ward-ProceediD.gs-Appeal-Orden Appeal-
able.-With possible ueeptiOll of aD order granting new trial, 
only those orders mentioned in Prob. Code, § 1630, are appeal-
able in guardianship proceedings. 
[I] Id.-Proceedinp-Appea.l-Orders Appealable.-8inee Prob. 
Code, § 1630, does not mention an appeal from an order either 
granting or denying motion to vacate or annul a prior order 
of court, an appeal may be taken from such order in guardian-
ship proceedings only if in legal ei'feet it is tantamount to one 
or more of orders listed. 
[8] Id.-Proceedinp-Appea.l- Orders Appealab1e.-Petitioner's 
appeal from that portion of an order denying motion to annul 
order for appointment of I guardian is not tantamount to an 
order refusing to revoke letters of guardianship so as to be 
appealable under Prob. Code, § 1630, where respondent was 
discharged as guardian approximately four year before this 
proceeding was commenced, and aecordingly his letteR are no 
longer in ei'feet and could not be revoked bJ U!r1 on1et- to 
vacate and anrml. . 
APPEAL from an ordel" of the Superier Go\llt of Imperial 
County denying motion to set aside an order ror appolaobmeu.t 
of guardian. L. J. KOMer, Judge. Appeal dW ..... 
• -orris Lwriae for .A.pprl'l P .. 
Benou. & 1WaK, lIan:7 W ...... · ... ·~·Ir ..... ~., ill' 
Jtesponde1rt. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Hiroko Kawakita and her brot-her, '.romo,-&, 
are native-born children of Yasabura Kawakita, an alien 
Japanese, who was appointed guardian of his children and 
of their estates in 1923. In 1927, Yasabura furnished the 
funds to purchase 8 lot in Calexico on which there was a 
two-story brick business building. The purchase price of the 
property was $33,000. and $7,000 in improvements were 
[IJ See Cal.Jur., Guardian and Ward, § 24. 
JIcK. Die. Reference: [1-3] Guardian and Ware, 5 ~~ 
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added during the next ten years. Title was taken in the 
names of the children as tenants in common, subject to a 
trust deed in favor of Yasabura. Hiroko att<!ined her majority 
on October 19, 1937, and Tomoya attained his on September 
26, 1942. In 1938, Yasabura filed an account of his guardian-
ship. The court approved the account. but refused to close 
the guardianship of Hiroko and her estate because of the deficit 
due to Yasabura on the trust deed. in 1939. Tomora went 
to Japan where he remained throughout the war and until 
his return to the United States in 1946. Yasabura was sent 
out of the state to an internment camp for Japanese aliens 
in February, 1942. On March 10, 1942, he executed a general 
power of attorney to his daughter, Hiroko, who was subse-
quently removed to a relocation center in Arizona in ~lay, 
1942. In an instrument dated "April, 1942" Yasabura re-
signed his guardianship. This instrument was not filed until 
1.1ay 4, 1942. On April 8. 1942, W. H. Lorenz. respondent 
herein, petitioned the Superior Court of Imperial County 
to be appointed guardian of the estates of Hiroko and 
Tomoya, who were described in the petition as "minors" 
owning the building mentioned above. The petition related 
that Y asabura had been acting as guardian. but that he had 
been evacuated from Imperial County and was "therefore 
unable to look after this estate." The petition also stated 
that respondent was "familiar with the rental of properties 
and [was] willing to act as the guardian of the property 
belonging to the minors." The nominatio'n filed with respond-
ent's petition related that the "minors" owned the property 
described in the petition, and that they nominated respondent 
as their guardian. The nomination concluded with the fol-
lowing statement: "I, Hiroko Kawakita am now 25 years of 
age and Tomoya Kawakita is now 20 years of age." The 
nomination was signed by Hiroko only. Neith,er the petition 
nor the nomination was verified. Notice of hearing on the 
petition was posted at the court house, but the record is bare 
of any evidence that personal notice was given to the parents 
of the "minors" or that a showing was made that such notice 
could not be given. Nor does it appear that notice was given 
to any person having the custody of the "minors" or their 
estates. The printed form used for the affidavit of notice 
recites only the posting of notice at the court house; the parts 
relating to personal notice are crossed out. After a hearing, 
of which there is no transcript, the court entered an order 
011 April '¥I, 1942, reciting that "due proof having been made 
) 
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• • . and the court finding that notice of the hearing of said 
petition has been given te ______ as required by law;" 
and ordering that respondent be appointed guardian .. upon 
his giving a surety bond ., and taking and subscribing 
the oath required by law. ,. His oath was dated April 30, 
1942. On the same day, respondent filed a verified petition, 
in which he described himself as the •• duly appointed, quali-
fied and acting guardian of the estate of the above named 
minors, " asking that an order be made permitting him as guar-
dian to sell the property of the guardianship estate. His letters 
of guardianship were not issued until five days later, May 5, 
1942. Notice of hearing on the petition for permission to 
sell was posted at the court house and published three times 
in a local newspaper. The record does not reveal any notice 
of a place where offers or bids would be received. (Prob. 
Code, §§ 1534, 780, 782.) Further, there is no record that 
an appraisal was made. (Prob. Code. § 784.) The only state-
ment of the value of the property that appears in the record 
was that made by respondent in his petition. He alleged 
therein that the rental value of the property was not sufficient 
to pay taxes, upkeep, and the interest on the debt of $13,206.25, 
secured by the trust deed to Ynsnbura; that the property was 
not worth more than $6,000; and that he had received an 
offer in that amount. It was further alleged in the petition 
that Hiroko had attained her majority ., but that there will 
be no money to go into the gU:lrdianship from the sale of 
this property for the reason thst the said property is encum-
bered with a trust deed in favor of Y. Kawakita ... and that 
therefore the wards have no equity whatever, and [reilpondent] 
therefore thinks that it will be for the best interests of this 
estate that the building be sold and the estate closed." The 
petition for permission to sell was subsequently granted, and 
a sale was consummated to John T. Rashid for $6,000. Since 
the amount due on the trust dc!'ed was greater than the sale 
price, the guardianship estate rE'Ceived nothing from the sale. 
The $6,000 less the costs of the sale, were deposited in the 
"blocked" bank account of Ys..~bura, pursuant to a license 
issued by the United States Del':utment of the Treasury. The 
guardian's annual reports for 19-13 and 1944 were approved, 
but the estate was not closed until October 2, 1946, when the 
court discharged the guardian and ordered the assets of the 
estate-$329.68-distributed to the wards. 
Tomoya returned to the United States in 1946. He was 
thereafter indicted for and conncted of treason. Judgment 
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and sentence of death were imposed on October 8, 1948. 
(United States v. Kawakifa, 96 F.Supp. 824; aff'd 343 U.S. 
717 [72 S.Ct. 950, 96 L.Ed. 1249 j ; reh. den., 344 U.S. 850 [73 
S.Ct. 5, 97 L.Ed. 660]; motion to modify death sentence 
denied, 108 F.Supp. 627; death sentence commuted to life 
imprisonment by Presidential Proclamation of October 29, 
1953.) 
In March 1947, Hiroko, Tomoya, and Yasabura filed an 
action in the Superior Court of Imperial County against re-
spondent and John T. Rashid, the vendee of the guardian's 
sale, to quiet title to the property sold by the guardian and 
to recover damages for fraud, or, alternatively, to declare the 
guardian's deed null and void and to require Rashid to con-
vey the property to the plaintiffs Hiroko and Tomoya. This 
action was dismissed on motion of the defendants on February 
28. 1952, for lack of prosecution. The dismissal has been 
afiirmed. (Post, p. 848 [271 P.2d 18].) 
The present proceedings were instituted in the Superior 
Court of Imperial County on October 14, 1950, wh~n Hiroko 
and Tomoya moved to "vacate, annul and declare void the 
Order for Appointment of W. H. Lorenz as [their] Guardian 
and all subsequent orders based thereon on the ground that 
the court was without jurisdiction to entertain the aforesaid 
guardianship proceedings and to make any of the orders in 
this proceeding . . ." After a hearing, the court made an 
order denying Tomoya's motions, denying Hiroko's motion to 
annul the appointment of respondent as guardian, and grant· 
ing Hiroko's motion to declare void all orders in the guard-
ianship proceedings subsequent to the appointment of the 
guardian "in particular the order concerning the sale of real 
property . . ." 
Hiroko noticed an appeal from that part of the order 
denying her motion to annul the appointment of respondent 
as her guardian and from each and every part of the order 
denying the motions of Tomoya. She contends that the order 
appointing the guardian is void on its face because it ap· 
pears from the judgment roll that she was not a minor, that 
the statutory requirements of notice were not complied with, 
and that the appointment was not" necessary and convenient." 
Respondent contends, on the other hand, that the order ap-
pointing him guardian is not void on its face and that Tomoya 
cannot challenge the denial of his motions on the grounds that 
he did not appeal and that he is now civilly dead. We have 
concluded that the order appealed from is not an appealable 
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order and that therefore we have no jurisdiction to review 
these contentions in this proceeding. 
[1] Section 1630 of the Probate Code provides that" An 
appeal may be taken to the Supreme Court from an. order 
granting or revoking letters of guardianship; settling an ac-
count of a guardian; instructing or directing a guardian; or 
refusing to make any order heretofore mentioned in this 
section. " With the possible exception of an order granting 
a new trial (see Estate of Armstrong, 8 Ca1.2d 204, 206 [64 
P.2d 1093]), it is settled that only those orders mentioned in 
section 1630 are appealable in guardianship proceedings. 
(G-uardianship of Leach, 29 Ca1.2d 535, 539 [176 P .2d 369] ; 
Estate of Kay, 30 Ca1.2d 215, 217 [181 P.2d 1]; see also 
Kramer v. Superior Oourt, 36 Ca1.2d 159, 161 [222 P.2d 874] ; 
Fredrickson v. Superior Oourt, 38 Ca1.2d 593, 596-597 [241 
P.2d 541].) [2] That section does not mention an appeal 
from an order either granting or denying a motion to vacate 
or annul a prior order of the court. Accordingly, an appeal 
may be taken from such an order only if in legal effect it is 
tantamount to one or more of the orders listed. (See Lyon 
v. Goss, 19 Ca1.2d 659, 670 [123 P.2d 11] ; Estate of Estrem, 
16 CaJ.2d 563, 566 (107 P.2d 36].) If respondent's letters 
of guardianship were still in effect ~ might reasonably 
be contended that the court's order refusing to vacate and 
annul the order appointing him guardian was tantamount to 
an order refusing to revoke letters of guardianship. (See 
In re Dahnke, 64 Cal.App. 555, 559 1222 P. 381] ; Estate of 
Estrem, supra, 16 Ca1.2d 563, 566; cf., Guardianship of Bra-
zeal, 117 Cal.App.2d 59, 60 [254 P.2d 886].) [3] In the 
present case, however, respondent was discharged as guardian 
approximately four years before this proceeding was com-
menced, and accordingly his letters are no longer in effect 
and could not now be revoked by any order to vacate and 
annul. Nor is the order appealed from equivalent to any of 
the other orders listed in section 1630. 
The appeal is dismissed. 
Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Schauer, J., and Spence J., eon-
curred. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
The majority has seen fit to di!'lmiss tbis a-ppeal upon the 
sole ground that the orc1('r ap1'(',:1('<1 from is not an appealable 
order. Such a decision is not ouly erroneous and m,j.sleafling 
) 
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but is based upon an inadequate analysis of section 1630 of 
the Probate Code. 
It is well recognized in California that the right of appeal 
in probate matters is purely statutory and exists only in those 
cases in which it is gh·en by statute. (Estate of Funkenstein, 
170 Cal. 594 [150 P. 987] ; In re Walkerly, 94 Cal. 352 [29 
P. 719J.) It is equally well recognized that the right to appeal 
in guardianship matters is governed exclusively by Probate 
Code, section 1630. (Guardianship of Leach. 29 Ca1.2d 535 
[176 P.2d 369].) 
In the case at bar the appellants appealed from an order 
denying a motion "to vacate, annul and declare void" the 
appointment of a guardian. Since such an order has to do with 
guardianship proceedings it can only be appealed from if 
provision for such appeal has been made by section 1630 of 
the Probate Code. It therefore becomes apparent that the 
appealability or nonappealability of the instant order is de-
pendent upon the provisions of section 1630 of the Probate 
Code. 
Section 1630 of the Probate Code provides that" An appeal 
may be taken to the Supreme Court from an order granting 
or revoking letters of guardianship; settling an account of a 
guardian; instructing or directing a guardian; or refusmg to 
make any order heretofore mentioned in this section." ( Em-
phasis added.) This section makes it unquestionably clear 
that an appeal may be taken from an order granting or re-
voking letters of guardianship and that an appeal may also 
be taken from a refusal to make either of th('se orders. Thus 
an order revoking letters of guardianship is an appealable 
order. Likewise an order refusing to revoke letters of guar~ 
dianship is also an appealable order. We therefore find that 
section 1630 of the Probate Code makes express provision for 
the appeal of an order refusing to revoke letters of guardian-
ship. Not only does section 1630 expressly provide for the 
appeal of orders refusing to revoke letters of guardianship 
but the appeal of such orders has long been the acc('pted prac-
tice in California. (In re MorltofJ. 179 Cal. 595 [178 P. 294]; 
Matter of Schwartz. 171 Cal. 633 (154 P. 3041; Guardianship 
of Rapp, 54 Cal.App.2d 461 [129 P.2d 1301.) The rule in 
California is well established that "An appeal may be taken 
from a judgment or ord('r of the superior court granting or 
refusing to grant, revoking or fl'fusing to revoke, letters of 
guardianship; ••• n (13 Cal.Jur. 167.) 
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Having determined that an order refusing to revoke letters 
of guardianship is an appealable order, we must now deter· 
mine whether in the instant case the order in question was one 
which refused to revoke letters of guardianship. Looking 
to appellants' motion of October 14, 1950, we find that they 
sought to "vacate, annul and dec1 are void the order of this 
court [probate court] made in this proceeding, on May 5, 1942, 
appointing W. H. Lorenz [respondent] a guardian of the 
estates of said Hiroko Kawakita and Tomoya Kawakita, ... " 
This order of May 5, 1942. which appellants sought to vacate 
was entitled "LETTERS OF GUARDIANSHIP" and it provided 
among other things that" W. H. Lorenz is hereby appointed 
guardian of" the estate of Hiroko and Tomoya Kawakita. 
This means that appellants sought to vacate the order of 
May 5, 1942, by which letters of guardianship were granted 
to respondent. The court's refusal to make such an order, 
vacating the order of May 5, 1942, was clearly a refusal to 
"vacate, annul and declare void" the letters of guardianship. 
If an order refusing to "vacate, annul and declare void" is 
the same thing as an order refusing to •• revoke" then the 
instant order refusing to vacate the letters of guardianship 
is without question an appealable order within the provisions 
of section 1630 of the Probate (Jpde. 
In comparing the word "revoke" with the word "vacate" 
we find that the courts of this country have frequently held 
the two terms to be synonymous (People ex rel. Filippone v. 
Marlin, 46 N.Y.S.2d 234, 235). As for comparing the word 
"revoke" with the word" annul" we find that to revoke is "to 
annul by recalling or taking back, . . . An annulling; a can-
cellation .... " Webster's New International Dictionary, 
second ed., 1933, unabridged.) In Black's Law Dictionary 
(third ed., 1933) it is stated that "revoke" means "To call 
back; to recall; to annul an act by calling or taking it back." 
The courts of this country have been in. accord with such defi-
nitions. (Braun Estate, 358 Pa. 271 [56 A.2d 201] ; Mayor, 
etc., of Houston v. Houston City St. Ry. Co .. 83 Tex. 548 [19 
S.W. 127]; Ford v. Greenawalt, 292 Ill. 121 [126 N.E. 555].) 
It is equally well established that the word .• revoke" means 
to "declare void." (O'Hagen v. K1'acke, 165 Misc. 4 [300 
N.Y.S. 351, 363] ; In re Will of Barrie, 393 Ill. 111 [65 N.E.2d 
433] ; Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Holmes' Esta·te. 
148 1'-'.2d 740, 742.) In California our courts have frequently 
used such terms as "revoke, " ., vacate" and" set aside" inter-
ch4D.geably. (Guardianship of Van Loan, 142 Cal. 423 (76 P. 
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37]; In re Mor/zotJ, supra, 179 Cal. 595; Estate of Eikeren-
kotter, 126 Cal. 54 [58 P. 370] ; In re Dahnke, 64 Cal.App. 555 
[222 P. 381].) It thus becomes apparent that a motion to 
"vacate, annul and declare void" is the equivalent of a 
motion to ., revoke. " 
In the case at bar the appellants sought to .. vacate, annul 
and declare void" the letters of guardianship of respondent. 
This was in effect a motion to revoke such letters. The order 
of the probate court refusing to revoke such letters of guar-
dianship was clearly and unequivocally an appealable order 
within the provisions of section 1630 of the Probate Code. 
The net result is that the order appealed from is an appeal-
able order and it is incumbent upon this court to decide the 
case upon its merits. The mere fact that the guardian was 
previously discharged is immaterial since the order to revoke 
and vacate because of an absence of jurisdiction does more 
than merely discharge a guardian. it goes back and canCels 
all proceedings based upon such appointment. It is well 
established that an order of the court which. as here. is void 
on its face can be set aside at any time. (In re Dahnke, 
supra, 64 Cal.App. 555; People v. Greene, 74 Cal. 400 [16 P. 
197, 5 Am.St.Rep. 448]: Estate of Estrem. 16 Cal.2d 563 
[107 P.2d 36].) 
In the case at bar the lower court committed a patent and 
obvious error in refusing to revoke the letters of guardian-
ship since the record of the order of appointment was void 
on its face. The valid appointment of a guardian for a minor 
requires that notice o! the appoint.ment proceedings be given 
to the parents of the minor, or alternatively. proof must be 
made that such notice cannot be given. It is also requisite 
that the appointment be "necessary or convenient." (Prob. 
Code. §§ 1440. 1441.) In the instant case no notice was given 
to the parents of Hiroko and Tomoya and an appointment 
made without such notice is a nullity. (In re Dahnke, supra, 64 
Cal.App. 555; Guardianship of Kerns. 74 Cal.App.2d 862 
[169 P.2d 9751; Guardianship of Van Loan. supra, 142 Cal. 
423.) The record also indicates that the appointment was 
neither necessary nor convenient since at the time the letters 
of guardianship were issued the record before the court 
showed that the property of the estate was worth less than 
$6,000; that liabilities amounted to more than $13.000; and 
that therefore Hiroko and Tomoya had "no equity whatever" 
in the property which was to constitute the guardianship 
estate. The law in California is well established that an order 
) 
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appointing a guardian of the person and estate of a minor may 
be vacated at any time, if the record of the appointment dis-
closes affirmatively upon its face that the order was void 
for want of jurisdiction of the court to make it. (Estate of 
Eikerenkotter, supra, 126 Cal. 54.) It thus becomes apparent 
that the order which appellants sought to revoke was a nullity 
and should have been set aside. 
For these reasons I would reverse the order appealed from 
with directions to enter an order setting aside the order ap-
pointing respondent guardian of these petitioners and all 
subsequent orders based thereon. 
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied June 23, 
1954. Carter, J., was of the opinion that the petition should 
be granted. 
